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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The UE International had previously emphasized to the local the need to launch a campaign to 
avert any type of plant closing. Local research did not paint a pretty picture of Stewart-Warner's future in 
Chicago. Many of the early warning earmarks of a possible plant closure were evident. While the outside 
walls of the main plant were repainted quite frequently, inside examination told another story. No amount 
of paint could replace the out-of-date equipment, freight elevators that didn't operate, and employees 
using their own ingenious and primitive methods to produce for the company. 
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"Whose idea is this? Are they crazy or what!" 
"I don't know why they don't fix that machine, we can't really 
do our work right without it." 
Complaints like these can be heard in any number of factories, 
sometimes said with laughter, sometimes in anger. For most 
workers, changes in methods of manufacture and other business 
decisions are totally beyond their ability to affect, but all business 
decisions can have consequences on the future of their jobs. 
There is one line of thinking which says that only if workers 
are owners or partners with management can they have an effect 
on their futures. This article is a short summary of a yet unfinished 
story of one local union's efforts to preserve jobs and have an effect 
on management decisions without taking that route. The local is 
the United Workers Association-United Electrical Workers (UWA-
UE) Local 1154 at Stewart-Warner Corp. in Chicago. 
Stewart-Warner is a major manufacturer of automotive and 
lubrication equipment whose flagship operation has been located 
on Chicago's north side for over 90 years. In the 1950s there were 
more than 5,000 production workers employed there, but by 1981 
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this had shrunk to 2,600 and today there are just over 1,500 people 
working at four plant locations. 
In January 1985 Stewart-Warner sent the union a letter stating 
that it was relocating the Chicago plant's Alemite pump line to 
its (non-union) plant in Johnson City, Tennessee. The company 
estimated this would affect 150 jobs, but the union's own calcula-
tions (figuring both direct and indirect job loss) put that number 
closer to 500. 
The UE International had previously emphasized to the local 
the need to launch a campaign to avert any type of planjt closing. 
Local research did not paint a.pretty picture of Stewart-Warner's 
future in Chicago. Many of the early warning earmarks of a 
possible plant closure were evident. While the outside walls of 
the main plant were repainted quite frequently, inside examination 
told another story. No amount of paint could replace the out-of-
date equipment, freight elevators that didn't operate, and 
employees using their own ingenious and primitive methods to 
produce for the company. 
The union called a job security meeting and invited all factory 
employees to attend. At this meeting leadership and membership 
put their heads together to make sense of what was happening. 
Committees were set up to do further information-gathering 
outside the plant, community outreach, and research on the 
financial status of the company. In reaching out to the community, 
the local met with the Midwest Center for Labor Research 
(MCLR), who provided further in-depth analysis of S-W's financial 
status. 
Research showed a conscious policy of disinvestment on 
management's part, revealing that 1979 was the last year that S-W 
had not bled all of its profits into dividends for the stockholders. 
The average company, including all of S-W's competitors in the 
1980s, utilizes approximately 50% of its profits to pay out 
dividends and puts the other 50% to use inside the company. 
Stewart-Warner, in contrast, had paid out 204% of its profits in 
dividends in 1983, 157% in 1982, 127% in 1985 and 97% in 
1984—leaving little for investment in new equipment or product 
development. 
Fighting on Two Fronts 
Since 1985, the union has developed a two-pronged strategy of 
taking on Stewart-Warner's policy of mismanagement and 
disinvestment. The first front is a shopfloor fight for job security, 
and the second is a broad alliance of community, church, labor 
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and elected politicians to keep S-W in Chicago. 
The union felt positive about its two-front strategy. It had caught 
onto S-W's disinvestment strategy early enough to prevent a plant 
closing, and the S-W corporate make-up, with the entire Board of 
Directors residing in the Chicago area, provided a good oppor-
tunity to appeal to S-W's social obligation not to desert the very 
community that had made it successful. 
The union knew that contract negotiations beginning in late 
1985 would be difficult, and that an internal battle alone would 
not achieve all the gains that S-W workers needed. The UE 
International has encouraged its locals to develop both internal 
and external campaigns to save jobs, calling on its members to: 
"Develop coalitions with labor, community, and church groups 
with a common interest in halting plant closings. . . . Train 
stewards and active members to report to the union leadership 
shop areas and equipment being neglected, jobs being shipped out 
or subcontracted as well as mismanagement that threatens jobs." 
In developing a bargaining strategy, the local made job security 
the number one issue. The union held lunch-time meetings in 
every department in the plant, ensuring that the union would have 
maximum opportunity to talk to every worker about the likelihood 
that unless S-W changes its management policies, we'd be out of 
work soon. To further workers' understanding of the issues at 
stake, the local distributed leaflets on job security. A typical leaflet 
raised provocative issues like the following: 
Stewart-Warner is losing orders because they haven't lifted 
a finger to improve their products. They can't be competitive 
with out-of-date gauges, built with poor quality parts on 
crummy equipment. 
In response, management issued a letter to all employees 
claiming that the union's leaflet was a "total distortion of the facts." 
Calling the leaflet "totally irresponsible, inaccurate and a vicious 
attack," the company insinuated that such actions by the union 
would only help the company's competition and could hurt 
whatever few remaining jobs there were. 
The membership's reaction was swift. Many workers went to 
their stewards with spicy stories of gross company mismanage-
ment and neglect. The union printed a response to the company's 
letter that included a sampling of these stories: 
Example 1: One of the panels made in Dept 21 uses a 
part called 'webbing.' Until April 17, 1984, Dept 25 made 
the webbing. Then the company decided to subcontract the 
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webbing production. Last October Dept 21 started getting webbing 
from Altra Corp. in Elk Grove Village, instead of from Dept 25. 
This month 14,616 pieces of webbing came in from Altra with 
incorrect dimensions in one of the holes. 
Although S-W gave incoming inspection a number of webbing 
dimensions to check, the depth of this hole wasn't one of them. 
The company is having a 52nd L.G. employee drill out the hole 
to the correct dimension. It's going to take about 2 weeks to fix 
all the bad parts at $12.77 an hour. This will cost S-W 15 cents 
per piece. 
When Dept 25 made the webbing, all the dimensions were right. 
If S-W is so concerned about us "and the families we support," 
why subcontract out a job that we were doing right. 
Example 2: Dept 20 uses a magnet shaft made in Dept 6. 
Recently over 100,000 of these magnet shafts had to be sent back 
to screw machine because they were defective. Bill Williams, 
foreman of Dept 6, had substituted inferior tooling to be used in 
the production of magnet shafts. This forced the screw machine 
operators to hand grind each countersink. They complained to 
Williams many times that they were being forced to produce junk 
that wouldn't last and that no amount of SPC [statistical process 
control] was going to fix. How much money did Bill Williams' 
inferior tooling save the company? 
The next day engineers and managers were standing over the 
worker drilling out holes in Example 1, with blueprints in one hand 
and the union leaflet in the other. The foreman in Example 2 was 
kicked upstairs to a new position shortly thereafter and better 
tooling was finally purchased. 
Despite the appeal of the union's message, many workers felt 
deeply cynical about whether workers can ever actually gain job 
security. This was generally summarized, "You're right, but the 
company's going to do whatever the company wants to do." 
S-W management tried to reinforce this attitude by taking a "this 
is really none of your business" posture on all management 
decisions involving production and/or job changes. Although they 
would mouth phrases like "we're very interested in what you have 
to say," their inaction on workers' suggestions and their deliberate 
attempts to withhold information from the union showed that the 
company was trying to make the union appear to be useless and 
powerless on job retention issues. 
While trying to keep the union at bay, the company attempted 
to start a Quality Circle program in a portion of the plant. The 
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UE has always taken a position against Quality Circles (QCs), 
maintaining that: "These programs split workers by rewarding 
those who undermine the jobs and conditions of others. . . . 
Behind the rhetoric of 'workplace democracy' and 'job enrich-
ment,' such schemes actually undermine whatever workers' 
control exists in the shop. Workers are pressured to pass on to 
company officials their own intimate knowledge of the job. This 
is then used by management to change work processes and to 
more closely control the workers." This aptly describes S-W's QC 
effort. The local notified the company that it would not take part 
in any type of Quality Circle, and the program never got off the 
ground. 
But while the union did not want to get involved in Quality 
Circles, it did actively involve itself in any shopfloor changes that 
affected jobs. Most notable of these activities was the union's role 
in setting up work centers in the assembly areas. 
Under the work center system, the worker continues to do only 
one function in an assembly process over and over again, but all 
assembly workers are supposed to have the knowledge to perform 
every other process performed in the work center and each piece 
is immediately totally assembled. S-W's reason for setting up work 
centers was to reduce the damage and deterioration of parts that 
was occurring under the old assembly system and to even out the 
inventory of parts. 
While the union understood the company's need for fewer 
rejects and the value of a more skilled workforce, the leadership 
and workers alike were concerned about how the work center 
would be set up, the potential elimination of jobs, and the 
adjustment of pay rates for higher skill levels. 
Rather than work with the union on these issues, management 
tried to implement the new ideas without informing the union. 
The union demanded that the company bargain with them over 
how the new work centers would be set up, and after negotiating 
to the point of deadlock, the company attempted to go ahead and 
set up the centers the way it wanted. S-W put up postings for 
workers to bid on the newly structured jobs, promising a higher 
labor grade for the position. 
The union had done its work among the workers in the assembly 
departments, however. Every worker knew that if the company 
set up the work centers they way it wanted, they would be stuck 
with them, good or bad. When the bids went up, hundreds of 
workers from departments all over the plant bid on the jobs, 
including workers in higher labor grades bidding down and 
workers in the same labor grade bidding across classification. 
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Contractually, the company must examine every bid before 
awarding the job to an employee. The hundreds of bids would 
take days and even weeks to process. Management knew the 
workers were sending them a message—sit down with the union 
and work something out. 
Management did sit down with the union and a formal letter 
of agreement was reached on specific aspects of the work centers: 
rates of pay, how the job is filled, cross training, etc. While every 
issue was not resolved, the negotiations started a better trend. 
With the labor contract expiring December 1, 1985, negotiations 
began in October and continued for more than a year. S-W said 
it needed major economic concessions in order to remain compe-
titive, but it flatly stated that it would never give any job security 
commitments in the contract. In January 1986 the union decided 
to wage an in-plant battle and told the company that it did not 
want any further contract extensions after January 31. S-W 
responded by trying to destroy the union economically by 
eliminating the dues checkoff, but the union successfully collected 
dues by hand. Finally in November 1986, a new contract 
containing some job security provisions was ratified by an 89% 
vote of the membership. 
The job security items included: one-month minimum advance 
notification of any decisions involving relocation or shutdown of 
plants, departments and/or product lines; monthly labor-
management meetings- where the union can raise any issues 
involving company business standing, plans to develop new 
product lines, technology changes and any other matter that is 
not a grievance; a commitment to meeting with government 
officials about job training programs that can facilitate job 
retention at the plant; and extra rights and benefits for any workers 
permanently affected by the elimination of a particular job. 
The Community Campaign 
While the in-plant struggle was going on, the second front of 
the union's job security strategy was also developing. The Coalition 
to Keep Stewart-Warner Open became an active organization of 
S-W workers, community groups and churches. Local union 
leadership clearly understood throughout the contract fight that 
the Coalition's effort to save S-W jobs was an integral part of 
obtaining the job security provisions in the labor contract. 
Building the Coalition was a combined effort of many groups 
and individuals. Most notable among these, besides the union, 
were MCLR and the Northwest Community Organization (NCO), 
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a 25-year-old umbrella group active on Chicago's north and 
northwest sides. More than a dozen organizations and a number 
of individual politicians and major religious leaders are now 
members of the Coalition. 
The Coalition defines its purpose as: "to keep Stewart-Warner 
jobs in Chicago by organizing labor and community support for 
our efforts; by pushing public officials to respond to this job loss 
by making public resources available and using public power to 
keep these jobs here; by seeking a dialogue with the management 
of Stewart-Warner about how to keep current jobs in Chicago and 
how to create new jobs for Chicago residents; by investigating the 
reasons for the current job loss and developing an alternative 
corporate plan that will keep and create jobs in Chicago." 
The Coalition's activities in pursuing these goals include rallies 
of more than 500 people, informational picket lines, press 
conferences, and special public hearings, like one recently held 
by the Chicago City Council. A recent Coalition project is an active 
home visiting campaign. These house calls on S-W employees and 
their neighbors are intended to actively promote the Coalition's 
efforts, build support and activity in the community, and involve 
others in all public efforts around the Stewart-Warner jobs issue. 
Another project taken on by the Coalition is a stockholder 
resolution to be submitted to the S-W Board of Directors. The 
resolution specifically calls on the corporation to change its 
reinvestment policies, to put money back into its present manufac-
turing facilities, and to develop product lines to be competitive 
in today's markets. 
The Coalition also is seeking joint cooperation from federal, state 
and city public officials to offer various inducements to Stewart-
Warner if it makes definite commitments to retain jobs and 
reinvest in its Chicago facilities. 
All of these projects are young and developing. The union and 
the Coalition are playing roles which advocate further business 
for Stewart-Warner not from the viewpoint of partners or 
managers, but from a worker and community perspective of 
wanting to retain and encourage reinvestment in the present 
facilities. 
Currently Stewart-Warner has changed its tone and is no longer 
refusing to talk about whether it plans to stay in Chicago. The 
company has indicated to the Coalition that it may participate in 
future conferences or discussions on these issues. Hopefully, with 
the continued development of in-plant and Coalition efforts, 1987 
will see a commitment from S-W to develop new product lines 
and to reinvest in its Chicago plants. • 
